“we must be astonished: Can it be that I am responsible for so much evil done against my will?”

I was thinking of how Montaigne complains that the writing of his dead friend, La Boétie, were used politically against his will to great harm. Many philosophical treaties were so used.

I like the delicate movement Milosz insinuates here:

1. An absolutely efficient computer could show us,
        2. with a correction for accidents, of course,
3. for how else to calculate the direction taken by a billiard ball after it strikes another?
        4.  Besides, it is permissible to maintain that nothing happens by accident.

On one hand (1) he brings forth a view of determinism that a computer can calculate the future, but (2) then surprises with the possibility of accidents which will break the original calculation. Then,(3) only a computer can see the chain of deterministic actions from something you do (giving us on purpose a very deterministic example which good pool players can foresee, but (4) these accidents are not really accidents, everything happens for a reason, but the computer can’t see this reason – the reason is not deterministic. What is it then?
A brilliantly delicate move.

Here Milosz speaks of what I now think is perhaps the ultimate question.
              What is the proper relation between the Guilt of innocence and ineffable Grace.


I find it illogical, but still inescapable, to convict myself of the astonishing crimes of which ignorance was no excuse, of which repentance is no absolution. Can the weight of this be balanced by any amount of unintended, unknown good I might have done or yet do?

No religion, philosophy or system of logic can answer this question for me, though they have tried. Its my own thumb on the scale that is in question.