What we want theories to do, more than anything else, is to cohere, to be consistent with one another. As ridiculous as this may sound, we would ideally want our theory of the sublimation of carbon dioxide to at some point be consistent with feminism. But in order for this to happen, we would have to discover the nature of the vast number of theories that would lie in between these two areas of inquiry. As we would proceed from one to the other, we would be confronted with the essential difference between the two. The natural sciences have the advantage of being able to demonstrate reproducibility of results to a very high degree of precision; the theory that water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit, given certain other parameters, can be (re) discovered by anyone. Alas, such is not the case with the social sciences, in which are found such theories as feminism. The social sciences are, perhaps, forever consigned to the circle of hell that hold middle-range theories, being neither able to explain very general things, like the meaning of it all, nor very specific things, like why John Smith of 123 Mockingbird Lane likes vanilla ice cream better than chocolate (with apologies to any Smiths possibly living at any such address). They're pretty good at explaining how violence on television affects youngsters in general, but again, not any given young person, nor why violence is always a bad thing (if indeed it is).
Recently, I have noticed the ascent of two disciplines in theory-making - economics and neurophysiology. I am hearing eminence grises in both fields happily straying pretty far from their traditional haunts and asserting theories thereunto. For example, there was the recent example of economists expounding on how dating between the sexes works (to me, this was REALLY a stretch). And more than ever, I am hearing that we enjoy poetry, fall in love, prefer certain music or swing on swings because certain processes in our brains switch on and off. Not our minds, mind you: but our brains.
What is important is not even whether such theories are plausible, but what their implications are for us as ethical beings. For example, if there is no such thing as mind, or if we believe that minds are nothing more than the present function point of our brains, then it is difficult to see how or why we would ever believe that there was an ethical component to anything. There would be no "should"; there would be only "is." As for an economic point of view, if rational self-gain is the only point to anything, then any other consideration is either incommensurable with that, or immensurable in and of itself.
A professor of Economics built a
“Theory” connecting African Americans higher hypertension rate to a
hypothetical slave preselection.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/magazine/20HARVARD.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&sq=black%20research%20slave&st=nyt&scp=9
Ok why not? But when you look for the analytical part of the
theory, all it says is: “The author came across a period illustration that seemed to show a slave
trader in Africa licking the face of a prospective slave”. To be fair, I
haven’t read the publication, but I was stunned by the methodology: Two
pre existing separate positions (higher hypertension rates and slave preselection) that this
theory builder try to connect with dots. While the Cartesian way of
doing the research would have consisted of breaking down hypertension known
causes and analyzing why they would have a larger impact on African Americans.
And quantifying genetic causes as a part of the pb and maybe
retracing them to nature or slaver selection. None of that is done and reading
this article, we are left with the idea that African Americans are irremediably
predisposed to hypertension. While any serious scientific research would have concluded
that genetics factors amount to an X%.
Why this urge to build lame theories?
Hicham.